Guide
How to read this dashboard, what the numbers mean, and where the data comes from.
Composite Threat Index
A single 0β100 score computed daily from 22 public sources. No classified data, no editorial judgement.
0β19
GREEN
20β44
YELLOW
45β69
ORANGE
70β100
RED
Security
40 pts
40 pts
FIMI
25 pts
25 pts
Hybrid
20 pts
20 pts
Economic
15 pts
15 pts
Trend arrow (β² RISING / β STABLE / βΌ FALLING) uses statistical change-point detection against the previous 7 days.
π Full methodology & formulas βDisinformation
Five narrative patterns targeting Estonia:
N1 Russophobia framing
N2 War panic
N3 Aid as theft
N4 Delegitimisation
N5 Victimhood & isolation
If a story triggers strong emotion before you can verify it β that is by design. Verify first.
Intelligence Map
Sensor layers on one map:
β IMINT β satellite activity at 38 sites
β Aircraft β ADS-B military tracks
β Vessels β AIS, shadow fleet, loitering
β FIRMS β thermal at military sites
β GPS jamming β Kaliningrad EW
β NOTAMs β airspace restrictions
NATO positions are never shown.
What We Monitor
MILITARY
HYBRID
MARITIME
NATO
DIPLOMATIC
β 22 source types Β· 6 intelligence disciplines Β· 38 military sites Β· updated every 15 min to daily
Limitations
Not classified β OSINT only. Cannot replace government assessments.
Activity β threat β Routine base activity is normal. Only sustained anomalies matter.
10β20m pixels β Soldiers and light vehicles not visible.
ADS-B gaps β Military can disable transponders. No signal β no aircraft.
Official Resources
Your national crisis portal β Check your government's emergency preparedness resources
NATO crisis response β Alliance emergency procedures
kapo.ee β Internal Security Service
112 β Emergency number Β· 112.ee
vm.ee β Travel advisories
Technical Details
Data Sources
Every number on this dashboard links back to a specific public source. 22 source types across 6 intelligence disciplines, updated continuously.
GEOINT Β· Satellite & thermal
SIGINT Β· Tracking & EW
War intelligence
Russia analysis
OSINT Β· Media
Infrastructure
| Source | Data provided | Update | Verify |
|---|---|---|---|
| π° GEOINT(3)β Satellite optical, radar, and thermal imagery | |||
| Sentinel-2 / ESA Optical imagery Β· 10m |
10-metre resolution optical imagery of 38 Russian and Belarusian military sites. Cloud-filtered, stitched into preview tiles. Analysed by Gemini 2.5 Flash vision model for activity level, aircraft counts, vehicle concentration, and construction. | Daily 10:30 | Copernicus |
| Sentinel-1 / ESA SAR radar Β· 5β20m |
C-band Synthetic Aperture Radar. Sees through clouds, rain, snow, and darkness β critical for Baltic winter when optical is blocked 70%+ of the time. Bright returns = metal (aircraft, vehicles, ships) and structures. Analysed by vision model for radar signature patterns. | Daily 11:00 | Copernicus |
| NASA FIRMS Thermal Β· 375m |
VIIRS satellite fire detections at monitored military sites. Two passes per day. Fire at a base indicates engine tests, live-fire exercises, or burn pits. | Every 6h | FIRMS |
| π‘ SIGINT / Tracking(5)β Aircraft, vessels, balloons, GPS jamming, airspace | |||
| OpenSky Network ADS-B aircraft |
Transponder positions of military and unidentified aircraft near Baltic airspace. Cross-referenced against military airframe database. GPS integrity analysis (NIC/NACp). | Every 15m | OpenSky |
| Digitraffic AIS Vessel tracking |
AIS positions in the Baltic Sea. Shadow fleet detection (uninsured tankers), Russian naval classification, loitering alerts near undersea cables. | Every 15m | MarineTraffic |
| SondeHub Radiosondes |
Weather balloon and radiosonde positions in Baltic airspace. Cross-border trajectory analysis. Non-standard types flagged. | Every 30m | SondeHub |
| GPSJam EW / GPS interference |
Crowd-sourced GPS interference mapping from ADS-B navigation accuracy reports. Covers Baltic corridor and Kaliningrad EW zone. | Daily | gpsjam.org |
| EASA NOTAMs / airspace |
Conflict zone NOTAMs. Military airspace restrictions, danger areas, live-fire exercise zones, missile test notifications. | Every 6h | EASA |
| βοΈ War Intelligence(5)β Combat losses, frontline, drone killboards | |||
| Ukrainian General Staff War losses |
Daily personnel and equipment losses. Personnel, tanks, IFVs, artillery, aircraft, UAVs, warships, and 8 other categories. | Daily 09:00 | russianwarship.rip |
| Oryx Visual confirmation |
Visually confirmed Russian equipment losses. Every item backed by photograph or video. The undisputed minimum floor for actual losses. | Daily (24h) | Oryx |
| SBS Group Killboard FPV drone kills |
Verified FPV drone kills from 15 Ukrainian unmanned units including Magyar's Birds, Nemesis, Phoenix, Achilles. Personnel, equipment hits, strike sortie counts. | Every 6h | sbs-group.army |
| DeepState Map Frontline data |
Frontline positions, active combat zones, attack directions, defensive positions. Occupied territory overlay for intelligence map. | Every 6h | DeepState |
| PetroIvaniuk Dataset Historical losses |
Complete daily equipment loss dataset since 24 Feb 2022. Powers 12-month trend charts and monthly comparisons. | Daily | GitHub |
| π·πΊ Russia Analysis(3)β Public opinion, economy, sanctions | |||
| Levada Center Public opinion |
Putin / PM / government approval, "right direction" sentiment, attitudes toward EU/USA/Ukraine, consumer sentiment, unemployment expectations. Russia's only major independent pollster. | Daily | Levada |
| Central Bank of Russia Exchange rates |
Official USD/RUB, EUR/RUB, CNY/RUB exchange rates. Cross-verified with independent exchange rate APIs. | Daily | CBR |
| OpenSanctions Sanctions data |
Cross-references persons and entities against EU, US OFAC, UK, and UN sanctions lists. Bulk dataset sync. | Weekly | OpenSanctions |
| π° OSINT / Media(8)β News, social media, OSINT enrichment, narrative detection | |||
| News RSS 35+ media feeds |
65+ feeds across Baltic, Nordic, and Eastern European media. Russian state (TASS, RT, Kommersant, Interfax), pro-Kremlin (Baltnews, RuBaltic), independent Russian (Meduza), Western security (Bellingcat, Breaking Defense, Nordic Defence Review), government sources (national MOD, border guard, CERT feeds), think tanks (CEPA, PISM, OSW, Jamestown), disinfo trackers (Propastop, EUvsDisinfo, Disinfo.eu). All classified by LLM into 20 narrative codes with confidence scoring. | Every 30m | ERR, EUvsDisinfo |
| Telegram 11 channels |
Pro-Kremlin Baltic channels: ΠΠ°Π»ΡΠΈΠΉΡΠΊΠΈΠΉ ΠΌΠΎΡΡ (Baltic Bridge), BALTNEWS, Π’Π΅Π½ΠΈ ΠΡΠΈΠ±Π°Π»ΡΠΈΠΊΠΈ, Vana Toomase teataja (Estonian-language), Alexey Stefanov (ΠΡΠ°Π²ΡΠΎΠ½Π΄ coordinator). Independent/monitoring: Propastop, RuBaltic, KOOS party. Content classified same as RSS. | Every 4h | BalticBridge |
| YouTube 13 channels |
Russian-language Estonian influencers identified by Propastop research: Aleksandr Chaplygin, Yana Toom, Kaldre TV, Π ΠΈΡΠΎΠ³Π΅ (Belobrovtsev), Rakurs Tallinn, Best Estonia (KOOS/Erik Hopp), ΠΠ°ΡΠ²ΡΠΊΠΈΠΉ Π½Π°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΠΈΡΡ. Parties: EKRE, KOOS. Independent: Varro Vooglaid, JΓΌri Kivit. Regional: ΠΠ°ΡΡΠΎΡΡΠ΅Π΅ ΠΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ ΠΠ°Π»ΡΠΈΡ (Current Time). | 2Γ/day | Propastop |
| Perplexity OSINT AI-enriched OSINT |
Automated deep-search queries via Perplexity Sonar API for campaign verification, person dossier enrichment, and gap-filling when primary sources lack context. Each query returns cited sources for verification. | On demand | Citations in each signal |
| GDELT Military news geocoding |
Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone. Queries military-related articles geocoded near 12 key monitored bases. Captures news coverage of military events even before ACLED verification. | 2Γ/day | GDELT |
| ACLED Conflict events |
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data. Verified conflict events in Russia and Belarus matched to nearest monitored military site. Fatalities, event type, and actor classification. | Daily | ACLED |
| Russian legislation 5 legal RSS feeds |
Early warning from Russian State Duma, Federation Council, and government portals. 3-tier keyword scoring for Baltic-relevant legislation (mobilisation, border, sanctions, military service, compatriots abroad). 111 articles scanned per cycle. | 4Γ/day | Duma |
| Military base fusion 6-source engine |
Weighted fusion of all 6 intelligence sources per site: Satellite optical (30%), Perplexity OSINT (25%), FIRMS thermal (15%), GDELT news (15%), ACLED events (10%), MilWatch (5%). Override rules prevent cloud cover from masking real activity. | 3Γ/day | Composite β see individual sources |
| β‘ Infrastructure(2)β Energy grid, economic indicators | |||
| Energy grid Nord Pool / national TSO |
National grid operator. Real-time electricity production, consumption, and cross-border power flows. | Every 4h | Nord Pool |
| Statistics Estonia Economic indicators |
CPI inflation, unemployment rate, GDP growth. Official national statistics API. | Weekly | National statistics office |
Every data point can be independently verified using the links in the "Verify" column. If a number on this dashboard does not match the original source, the source is authoritative.
Collection Schedule
Data collection runs on five cadences. All times are EET (UTC+2).
Every 15 minutes
ADS-B aircraft tracking, AIS vessel tracking
Every 30 minutes
Radiosonde tracking, news RSS feeds (35+ feeds)
Every 2β4 hours
Telegram collection (11 channels), YouTube collection (13 channels), Russian legislation monitoring, FIRMS thermal, platform healthcheck (β Telegram alert on issues)
Every 6 hours (02:00, 08:00, 14:00, 20:00)
DeepState frontline, SBS killboard, MilWatch, GDELT military news, Russia dashboard cache rebuild, intelligence map enrichment, EASA NOTAMs, military base fusion recalculation
Daily (08:00β11:00 morning pipeline)
War losses, economy metrics, GPS interference, ACLED conflict events, Perplexity OSINT enrichment, Sentinel-2 optical analysis (10:30), Sentinel-1 SAR analysis (11:00), narrative classification, campaign detection, daily briefing
The Russia Intelligence page rebuilds its cache at :40 past each 6-hour block, after all sub-sources (DeepState, SBS, war losses) have finished updating. Platform health is monitored every 2 hours β stale collectors, dead workers, or missing API keys trigger an automatic Telegram alert.
Satellite Imagery Analysis
Each of the 38 monitored military sites is analysed daily using two complementary satellite sensors, both processed by a vision model (Google Gemini 2.5 Flash).
π° Sentinel-2 Β· Optical
10m resolution Β· 5-day revisit Β· RGB true colour
Best for: aircraft counts, vehicle density, runway status, construction
Limitation: blocked by clouds (Baltic winter: ~70%)
Best for: aircraft counts, vehicle density, runway status, construction
Limitation: blocked by clouds (Baltic winter: ~70%)
π‘ Sentinel-1 Β· SAR Radar
5β20m resolution Β· 6β12 day revisit Β· C-band radar
Best for: all-weather monitoring, metal detection (aircraft, ships, vehicles)
Works through: clouds, rain, snow, smoke, darkness
Best for: all-weather monitoring, metal detection (aircraft, ships, vehicles)
Works through: clouds, rain, snow, smoke, darkness
Analysis outputs per site
Activity level
HIGH, MODERATE, or LOW β based on visible vehicle concentrations, aircraft presence, and infrastructure use.
Aircraft count
Number of aircraft visible on aprons and dispersal pads. Large aircraft (Il-76, Tu-22M3, Su-24) identifiable at 10 metres; fighters counted but not always typed.
Vehicle concentration
NONE, LOW, MODERATE, or HIGH β density of vehicles in motor pools, staging areas, and barracks perimeters.
Runway status
CLEAR or SNOW β indicates whether the runway is operationally usable.
Radar signatures (SAR)
NORMAL, ELEVATED, or SIGNIFICANT β density of bright radar returns (metal objects) on facility grounds. Compared to expected baseline.
New construction
Visible new buildings, earthworks, or fortifications. Change detection between observations.
Limitations: 10m optical resolution cannot show individual soldiers or light vehicles. SAR cannot identify object types β only detect metal concentrations. AI analysis has medium confidence at this resolution. Always cross-reference with ADS-B, FIRMS, and NOTAM data.
Monitored Military Sites (38)
Sites are organised by proximity and threat level to the Baltic states.
T1 β Direct border threat (<200 km)
Kaliningrad (Chkalovsk, Baltiysk, Chernyakhovsk, Gusev, Donskoye) Β· Pskov (76th VDV, Ostrov, Strugi Krasnye) Β· Leningrad (6th CAA, 138th MRB, Levashovo, Kronstadt) Β· Belarus (Machulishchy, Baranovichi, Grodno, Brest, Osipovichi)
T2 β Staging areas (200β500 km)
Klintsy Β· Smolensk Β· Bryansk Β· Tver-Migalovo
T3 β Strategic depth
Severomorsk (Northern Fleet HQ) Β· Olenya (Tu-22M3 / MiG-31K bombers)
T4 β Russian interior (movement indicators)
Yelnya (2021 buildup site) Β· Engels-2 (strategic bombers) Β· Morozovsk (Su-34) Β· Shaykovka (Tu-22M3) Β· Mulino (Zapad exercises) Β· Voronezh / Pogonovo (20th CAA) Β· Kursk-Khalino Β· Millerovo Β· Alabino Β· Sevastopol Β· Saki-Novofedorovka Β· Rostov (Southern MD HQ) Β· Nizhny Tagil (tank factory) Β· Kapustin Yar (missile range)
Equipment drawdown at T4 sites combined with buildup at T1/T2 is a mobilisation indicator. This is the pattern that preceded the 2022 invasion.
API Access
Public JSON APIs for integration with other tools:
GET /api/latest β Latest report and indicators
GET /api/threat-index β Composite Threat Index
GET /api/satellite/analysis-summary β All 38 sites activity levels
GET /api/satellite/analysis/{site_id} β Site analysis history
GET /api/stix/report/{date} β STIX 2.1 bundle
GET /api/briefing/{date}.html β Daily briefing
Full API reference β
GET /api/threat-index β Composite Threat Index
GET /api/satellite/analysis-summary β All 38 sites activity levels
GET /api/satellite/analysis/{site_id} β Site analysis history
GET /api/stix/report/{date} β STIX 2.1 bundle
GET /api/briefing/{date}.html β Daily briefing
Full API reference β